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KEN ADAMO: Good afternoon, everybody. It's an absolutely gorgeous day
here in New York City. I congratulate everyone who's lasted until the end of the
morning. But we saved good stuff for last. We're going to talk about various
subjects relating to the Patent Trial Appeal Board post-grant proceedings before the
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USPTO.1 I'm Ken Adamo. I am now a ghost in the machine. I have my own office
in Chicago. I was formerly in Big Law for 37 of my 45-year career. I was a Jones
Day partner and then a Kirkland & Ellis partner.
I'm joined by people who, interestingly, I've known almost as long as I've
been practicing. George Badenoch, who is now with Hunton Andrews Kurth here
in New York, Patricia Martone, who has recently become a member of the NYU
Law Engelberg Center on Innovation Law and Policy, also in New York, and John
Richards at Ladas & Parry, also in New York. But we also have Professor John
Thomas from Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, D.C., and Brian
Scarpelli from ACT | The App Association, also located in Washington, D.C. So
it’s an entirely East Coast crew, mainly New Yorkers, but we've got a couple of
people from Washington to join in. We're going to talk about three very, very
important PTAB2 issues this afternoon.
George Badenoch is going to address discretionary denial of inter partes
reviews, Patricia Martone is going to talk about Arthrex,3 which of course, we're all
waiting on the Supreme Court's decision. I'm not sure that after Google-Oracle,4
anyone would be terribly surprised by what the Supreme Court will do, but we'll
see. And John Richards is going to discuss the very esoteric, but exceedingly
important issue of the standing requirement if you lose in the PTAB—what do you
need to get to the Federal Circuit?
Professor Thomas and Brian Scarpelli will comment as the mood and the
moment strikes.
George, you're up first. You have the floor.
GEORGE BADENOCH: Well, thank you, Ken, and thank you Fordham
team. Hello, everyone. I would like to discuss the impact of two fundamental
differences between challenging a patent in court and challenging the validity of a
patent in administrative proceedings before the Patent Office. First, to get into
court, you need to have standing. You can't just be a citizen who doesn't like patents
or doesn't like a particular patent or doesn't like a patent owner or something, you
have to have a justiciable interest. That is not true for IPR5 proceedings before the
PTAB.
Unlike for court proceedings and many other types of administrative
proceedings, there is no standing requirement to file a petition for inter partes
review of a patent. Statute is clear on this point. Anyone not the patent owner can
file a petition for IPR of a patent. The second big difference is that, once you're in
court, assuming you have the standing to be there, you're entitled to your day in
court. Again, that is not true for IPR proceedings. A petitioner for IPR has no right
to be heard on the merits. The PTAB can, in its discretion, deny a petition for almost
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United States Patent and Trademark Office.
Patent Trial Appeal Board.
3
Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019), cert. granted
sub nom. U.S. v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 549 (2020), and cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 551 (2020),
and cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 551 (2020), and vacated and remanded sub nom. U.S. v. Arthrex,
Inc., 19-1434, 2021 WL 2519433 (U.S. June 21, 2021).
4
Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., 593 U.S. __ (2021).
5
Inter partes review.
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any reason, including reasons unrelated to the merits of the petition, and including
reasons that the petitioner has no control over whatsoever.
In case you think that this discretionary denial is unreasonable in a specific
case, you can't do anything about it, because the one thing that is clear under the
law now is that these decisions on discretionary institution are not appealable.
Now, these differences, I submit, have real consequences. First, from the standpoint
of the patent owner, the lack of a standing requirement increases the threat that the
patent owner will be confronted with the need to defend against multiple attacks
against the same patent. That includes, incidentally, attacks by what I'll call “IPR
filing companies” that have a business model which normally allows them to attack
patents on behalf of a whole industry without binding the companies that
collectively hire them to do that. I say “normally” because it's not always true. The
lack of a standing requirement is qualified a little bit by the requirements that the
petition must name, besides itself, all real parties in interest and by the fact that the
one-year requirement that you file a petition within a year of a complaint being
served on you applies to all real parties in interest as well, and by the fact that all
real parties in interest will be bound by the result.
The problem here is that there are conflicting decisions on what constitutes
a real party in interest. There are some cases that take a very broad view, like the
AIT-RPX case,6 where the focus is on whether a party that has some relationship
with petitioner, whether or not it will simply benefit if the patent is invalidated. The
court in the RPX case said that determining whether a non-party is a real party in
interest demands a flexible approach that takes into account both equitable and
practical considerations, with an eye toward determining whether the non-party is
a clear beneficiary that has a pre-existing relationship and so on. Other cases have
taken a very narrow view, which emphasizes whether or not the would-be real party
in interest actually wrote or funds or controls the IPR, cases like the Global Equity
Management case.7
Basically, in that case, it was admitted that Amazon, which the patentee was
trying to get declared a real party in interest, was controlling proceedings in the
district court. It indemnified the party in the district court, and yet, there was no
evidence that it actually wrote or controlled the IPR petition. The Board there found
that Amazon was not a real party in interest. It's not easy to reconcile these cases.
I should add that the language that is on the slide, that the Federal Circuit quoted
that language from the Board's decision in describing the case. The Federal Circuit
didn't actually decide that point because the issue was not appealable.
From the standpoint of the IPR petitioner now, which is the patent defendant
in the court case and the petitioner for IPR, discretionary denial creates problems
and uncertainty for petitioners. This is particularly true in cases where a patent is
asserted against multiple defendants. The Board has issued public or published
guidelines, I should say, so that its exercise of discretionary denial does not look
completely arbitrary. In the General Plastic8 case a few years ago, they listed seven
6

Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp., 897 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Glob. Eq. Mgt. (SA) Ltd. v. eBay Inc., 798 Fed. Appx. 616 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
8
General Plastic Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper
19 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 6, 2017).
7
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factors for weighing whether or not to consider a second petition against the same
patent which included some new arguments or new prior art to reply to whatever
was missing in a first petition that got rejected.
I won't go through all these factors, but it's clear that the Board thought that
it was unfair for the petitioner to be able to use what the patent owner said before,
or what the Board said before, as a roadmap to correct what was missing. Which is
interesting because it seems like the Board is not so concerned about whether the
patent is ultimately valid or invalid here. It's more concerned with cutting off the
debate after one round.
More recently, in the Apple v. Fintiv case,9 the PTAB published a list of six
factors that they would use to decide whether to consider a petition when there were
parallel proceedings going on in court. They include whether or not the district
court proceeding was stayed or likely to be stayed, the proximity of the trial date to
the IPR deadline, how much was invested in the proceedings in court, the overlap
of issues, and so on.
The telling point here is that it doesn't matter, or it's not a requirement, that
the petitioner be a party in the parallel proceeding they're looking at. In fact, in the
recent Mylan v. Janssen case,10 that was not the case. Mylan brought a petition in
plenty of time after being sued, within some months, and the Board refused to
consider it on discretionary grounds, not because of anything Mylan did, but
because there was another case that the plaintiff Janssen had brought against Teva,
and that case was about to go to trial. The Board rejected the petition on
discretionary grounds.
You have a situation where the petitioner, for reasons that have nothing to
do with the merits of the petition, and which are totally outside the control of the
petitioner, cannot get his petition heard. The problem, as I said before, is even more
compounded in cases where a patent is asserted against multiple defendants,
because what happens when the Board considers these factors as a practical matter
is that there's a tendency that the first petition will set the stage. Where the best
arguments and new prior art are not presented until a second petition, that is going
to be inefficient and that is something that the Board is less likely to entertain.
When it comes to joinder, they also don't like it if you're going to complicate
the proceedings with additional or complicating arguments. What happens is that
the first petition tends to set the framework for the IPR review. The problem here,
I'll submit, and that this remains equally true whether or not the first petition has
the best prior art or the best arguments, or whether or not it's the petition from the
person with the most at stake.
I guess what I'll submit in closing with the time here is that if your goal was
to try to figure out which prior art and arguments you want to select to make sure
you have the best, most meaningful review of the patent validity issues, that
probably selecting whoever files first is not the best way to do that. In fact, it may
be the worst way to do that, since everybody is going to rush to file first.

9

Apple, Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (P.T.A.B. March 20, 2020).
Mylan Labs. Ltd. v. Janssen Pharmaceutical, N.V., No. IPR2020-00440, 2020 WL
5580472 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 16, 2020).
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I'm going to leave it at that. I'm not proposing any answers here. The
Fordham management of the conference asked us to provoke discussion, so we
don't want to present anything where the answers are so easy as to be unworthy of
discussion.
KEN ADAMO: George, a couple of quick follow-ons, and then I'm going
to turn to Professor Thomas who I think is champing at the bit to raise this issue
and discuss it with us. If I'm recalling it correctly, there have been a number of
lawsuits filed—I believe Cisco and others may be involved—to try to attack this
offensive approach to get the PTAB told that they've got to not do things like walk
away from institution of an IPR simply because a third party is going to trial. 11 Am
I recalling that correctly? If I am, do you remember what the status of those suits
are at the moment?
GEORGE BADENOCH: You are definitely recalling it correctly, and I did
not check very recently as to what the status was. I didn't understand that we were
close to a decision in any of those cases. But yes, there are definitely suits filed on
this.
JOHN RICHARDS: Could I just jump in on that one? I think they had oral
argument about two weeks ago in California.
KEN ADAMO: Am I remembering it correctly, John, it's eight or nine really
substantial users of the post-grant proceeding practice that are the plaintiffs of the
case? Very good. George, in view of the fact that the IPRs were put in play at the
same time CBMRs 12 were put in play, and CBMRs did require—they've now
sunsetted, of course, but CBMRs did require an accusation of infringement. It's sort
of hard to say that lack of standard standing was inadvertent on Congress's part, is
it?
GEORGE BADENOCH: I think that's correct. I don't mean to suggest it
was inadvertent. I think what was inadvertent is I'm not sure that Congress
understood what the consequence would turn out to be if you had no standing
requirement. I'm referring here to where you had people that were filing IPRs for
reasons of stock manipulation, and to this whole new business model of companies
like RPX and Unified Patent. It's a surprising result. In a sense, I really don't think
it's fair. There's nothing wrong with Unified Patent and RPX competing with us law
firms about handling IPRs, but it's not quite right for them to say, "Look, we'll file
an IPR on your behalf, and if we win, you win. Don't worry if we screw up, you're
not going to be bound." I don't know that that consequence was appreciated when
Congress did it this way.
KEN ADAMO: The third quick point, and the only reason I'm raising this
is because I've had this happen in Eastern Texas, of course, of all places. The
concept of asking for a stay based on an IPR these days, one that's been instituted
where a third-party file of the petition is not new news. Arguably, you can have a
stay granted on that basis. If you get it granted on that basis, you are not involved
11
See Jan Wolfe, Apple, Google Team Up to Sue Patent Office over ‘Invalid’ Policy
Change, Reuters (Aug. 31, 2020 at 7:13 p.m.), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/ippatent-cisco/apple-google-team-up-to-sue-patent-office-over-invalid-policy-changeidUSL1N2FX2DF.
12
Covered Business Method Reviews.
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in the IPR, you're not looking at estoppel risk. It seems that one of these variations
on a theme here, again, they're not inadvertent. It's just the statute being used the
way Congress wrote it, right?
GEORGE BADENOCH: Well, I agree. I'm just thinking that, for some of
the reasons I would set forth, this is a problem on both sides of the issue.
KEN ADAMO: Professor Thomas, you're up. What's your reaction to all of
this?
JOHN THOMAS: My reaction is much the same as you two gentlemen. I
don't know if it's fools think alike or great minds running the same channel. It's one
or the other. I want to say I had my second vaccine dose this morning, so I'm a little
more cranky than usual, if that can be done. I blame it on that. I'd also like briefly
to acknowledge if it hasn't been done already this morning, that we've lost a giant,
in Professor Gerhard Shrecker who was the Director of the Max Planck Institute
while I was a Mitarbeiter there. Although we didn't always see eye to eye, without
his intervention, I would not have the opportunity to study at Max Planck, and I'm
very grateful for that. He was a fine scholar and he'll be remembered through his
scholarship.
I agree with all the points that the two of you have collectively raised. CBM,
the transitional business method proceedings that have just recently sunsetted,
could not be brought absent parallel litigation. I think it's tough to say that Congress
did not intend parallel administrative and litigation proceedings. Section 315, via
the Patent Act, says you have to bring an IPR within one year of being served a
complaint, full stop.13 There's nothing more about this. I'm disturbed by Valve14 and
the other cases that George identified. There aren't too many rights that you can’t
enforce just because somebody else did it first.
The access to quality-control function of patents at the PTAB I think is
critical. This trend leads to forum-shopping and has developed a rocket docket. For
example, the Western District of Texas promises a ruling before the Final Written
Decision of the PTAB, so the PTAB says, "We're not going to go there." It also
leads to piecemeal litigation. The PTAB has encountered dramatically reduced
workload on its appeal side. In 2012, the PTAB made an inventory of 26,000
pending appeals. That is down to 7,000 today. I believe the PTAB ought to use its
increased free time to actually address the important patent quality issues that are
presented to it, rather than turn them away on dubious grounds. Thank you, Ken.
KEN ADAMO: Now those numbers, Professor, the 27,000 down to about
7,000, that's in large measure because the additional administrative patent judges
have really been whacking at backlog of ex parte appeals, not PTAB stuff, right?
JOHN THOMAS: Well, the reasons are complex, I think, and I'll just say
them very briefly and bluntly. With the introduction to the RCE 15 and changes to
the account system under the Kappos regime,16 there was more emphasis placed on
13
14

35 U.S. Code § 315.
Valve Corp. v. Electronic Scripting Products, Inc., IPR2019-00064, Paper 10 (May 1,

2019).
15
16

Request for Continued Examination.
David J. Kappos, former Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office

(2009-13).
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the front end of examination rather than on RCEs. Examiners are increasingly less
willing to do more work once they've done the initial work. The agency even had
an RCE processing fire sale, where the examiners got more credit to process RCEs.
I also find that, increasingly, examiners are reluctant to write Examiners'
Answers when a Notice for Appeal is filed. At this point, it seems if you file a
Notice of Appeal, that's a gut check to the examiner, and rather than write an
answer, there's often a phone call to the petitioner. It used to be that applicants didn't
like the PTAB, now examiners don't like the PTAB either. To me, that's quite an
existential threat to the PTAB. At any event, as far as it goes in this end, I do think
there's a capacity to cover the IPRs that are right now being turned away.
KEN ADAMO: Your use of the term "existential threat" sort gets me now
to our next speaker. Brian Scarpelli, I'm not trying to keep you from getting into
this. If at any particular point you want to jump in, other than waiting for Patricia
because her stuff is exceedingly interesting as well. You can jump in, but otherwise,
Pat, you're on.
BRIAN SCARPELLI: Sure.
PATRICIA MARTONE: Okay, thank you very much. Hello to everyone.
I'm pleased today to have the opportunity to speak about the Arthrex case17 which
is now before our Supreme Court, involving a constitutional challenge to the
appointment of administrative law judges who decide IPR proceedings. These
people are called PTAB judges. The question I posed in this discussion is, "Has the
America Invents Act finally hit the wall in the Arthrex case?" This is a
constitutional challenge, as I said. There have been many court challenges,
including constitutional ones, but this, to me, is the most serious threat.
The answer I'm going to give is, "Maybe, but not for the reasons briefed
before the Supreme Court, and with an uncertain impact." Just briefly, let me
explain the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution.18 The Constitution
provides for two types of officers in the executive section of our government. These
are principal officers and inferior officers. Principal officers are nominated by the
President with the “Advice and Consent of the Senate.” Inferior officers may be
appointed by the President, by a Court or by heads of administrative departments.
The decisions of inferior officers must be subject to agency review.
The way in which PTAB judges are appointed is consistent with the
definition of inferior officer. However, those same judges issue final decisions not
reviewable within the Patent and Trademark Office. Arthrex claimed that this was
a violation of the Appointments Clause, because PTAB judges had the authority of
principal officers but were not appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. The Federal Circuit reviewed the role of PTAB judges using criteria
established in Supreme Court precedent, The Federal Circuit decided that, in fact,
PTAB judges fulfilled the role of principal officers and therefore that their
appointment was unconstitutional.
17
Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019), cert. granted
sub nom. U.S. v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 549 (2020), and cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 551 (2020),
and cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 551 (2020), and vacated and remanded sub nom. U.S. v. Arthrex,
Inc., 19-1434, 2021 WL 2519433 (U.S. June 21, 2021).
18
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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The Federal Circuit attempted to rectify this problem using the doctrine of
severability. This doctrine permits a court under certain circumstances to sever an
unconstitutional part of a statute to preserve the rest of the statute. I'll come back to
their solution in a moment, but the main issue before the Supreme Court is really
whether PTAB judges are principal officers or inferior officers. At the oral
argument19, the thing that the Supreme Court leapt on immediately was that there
was no agency review of PTAB decisions. The transcript shows questions from the
Justices about the lack of internal review, particularly Justices Kavanaugh and
Kagan, my favorite being Justice Kagan saying, "It's really a strange bird, why is
that?"
The appointment and role of PTAB justices is a strange bird because there
is apparently no other agency, where so-called inferior officers make final
decisions. Of course, that is exactly what Congress wanted to do. They wanted
PTAB judges to have the same decision-making authority as district court judges
but be appointed like inferior officers. I think the Supreme Court is seeing the issues
in this case purely as an administrative law matter.
I would say that the court is leaning towards holding part of the AIA statute
unconstitutional but wants to find a fix using the doctrine of severability, in order
to get rid of the unconstitutional part and preserve the rest of the statute. I would
say that the Supreme Court ignored what the Federal Circuit did, which was to seek
to convert PTAB judges to inferior officers by removing their tenure protections.
The Supreme Court focused on the part of the AIA statute that states, "Only
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board may grant rehearings.”20 Whether just removing
that language would solve the problem of rehearings within the Patent Office is
uncertain. Eliminating the sentence does not provide for a full internal review
process. What might that process look like? I would expect the Court to describe
the parameters of such a process in its opinion.
Arthrex counsel stated that the Director of the USPTO need only have the
opportunity to review a decision. and could delegate decision-making responsibility
to others. Relying on the Administrative Procedure Act is another approach. The
AIA gave the director broad rule-making authority, but it's unclear to me if it
extends to providing rules for an internal review process, because that's exactly
what Congress didn't want.
This may fall back into Congress' lap at which point anything can happen.
Another issue is which IPR proceedings are going to be affected by any
ruling of unconstitutionality. Of course, the Arthrex IPR is already decided. Arthrex
will not get the same relief as parties to undecided IPR’s will. Relief encompassing
all IPRs ever decided is not likely. Then there are all of these IPR decisions vacated
by the Federal Circuit on Arthrex grounds. These issues weren’t even referenced
during this argument.
I see a roadblock here. It's really what is found in the statutory time limits
for IPR’s. The problem is that a final determination must issue in a year. I don't see
how this change is going to fit within the statutory framework. I don't see how the
19

Available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2020/19-1434_o759.pdf.
20
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
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USPTO can accomplish this without straining their resources. I know people are
concerned about discretionary denial of IPR’s. An internal review process will
force the USPTO into being more efficient and more selective. If the Supreme
Court issues a decision which requires Congress to fix the statute, then anything
can happen.
KEN ADAMO: Pat, you timed out. Would you just finish if there are any
points in the remaining slides that you want to touch on? Why don't you take
another minute to go ahead and do that? Then I've got two quick points that I want
to make with you if that's okay. According to LAW360 yesterday, that backlog that
Arthrex is causing at the PTAB right now, it's over a hundred cases.21 Is that
accurate to your knowledge|?
PATRICIA MARTONE: Yes, I agree. While some IPR’s have been
resolved by settlement, I think they remain in the high 90s. That's the number of
cases that are there.
KEN ADAMO: To me, I suppose the most interesting point that I’d like us
to talk about is, okay, the Supremes have got to do something. Now, obviously,
they have a wide range of things they could do. They could just dump this back to
the Federal Circuit. They could say whatever the hell they wanted to say about what
was wrong with the original effects, base it on the AIA or whatever they want to
base it on and send it back to the Federal Circuit, it's possible.
PATRICIA MARTONE: It's possible, but I think that you have at least four
justices here including the three newest justices, plus Chief Justice Roberts who are
really concerned about the lack of an internal appeal process. I think they're going
to want to make a ruling focused on proper administrative procedure.
KEN ADAMO: Well, an interesting possibility. If it goes back to the circuit,
let's say that the justices can't figure out or don't want to be bothered a la Alice22
and 101,23 it's just too much down in the weeds for them. They want to tell the
circuit what's wrong with what it did, they didn't give them another shot? Something
very interesting is going to happen if they do that. As I recall, it is much more rote
than Arthrex. Am I remembering that correctly?
PATRICIA MARTONE: Yes. Right.
KEN ADAMO: As of about six weeks from now, Chief Judge Prost will no
longer be chief judge if I'm following the timetable correctly and I assume
everybody on this session understands that the next chief judge will be Judge
Moore. It'd be very interesting to see if the Supreme Court's paying any attention
to this change-over. There's a lot of different views in Washington about what the
Supreme Court thinks about the Federal Circuit. It'd be interesting if they do remand
it and Judge Moore, now being the chief judge, gets to take another shot at it. I don't
know that anybody's paying much attention to that point, that we're about to have a
change over as to who is the chief. It might be interesting.

21
A Breakdown of the PTAB Backlog Arthrex Caused, LAW360 (April 7, 2021 at 6:41
p.m.), available at https://www.law360.com/articles/1368752/a-breakdown-of-the-ptab-backlogarthrex-caused.
22
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
23
35 U.S. Code § 101.
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PATRICIA MARTONE: Part of the problem here is that much of the issues
that I've raised were never briefed. Nobody briefed what an internal review process
would look like. There was little briefing on the issue of severability. The briefing
of the parties and the amici were all focused on whether PTAB judges were
principal or inferior officers. No party or amici addressed the problem of fitting a
review process into the statutory 12-month decision deadline, which I think is going
to be very difficult.
KEN ADAMO: All right, but I guess back on the timetable at this point
because I do want to talk about standing, but here's my proposal in about the 24
minutes that we have left. Professor Thomas, I'm going to come back to you about
Arthrex after Mr. Richards does his presentation and then, Mr. Scarpelli, you've
been exceedingly patient. If you'd like to jump into this at some point after I give
Professor Thomas a chance on Arthrex, fine, and from there on out, we'll just have
at it with each other. There are no pending questions. Our time is ours to do what
we will with it. John, talk about standing, which is really interesting.
JOHN RICHARDS: Thank you, sir. 35 USC § 319 says that a part who is
dissatisfied with the final written decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board in
inter partes review may appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. Similar statutory language applies to post grant review. So, why doesn’t
everybody have the right to appeal?
Article III of the Constitution basically says that a court’s role is to decide
cases and controversies. That then sets up the question of who would win. Is there
a case or controversy just because somebody has lost an inter partes review or a
post-grant review before the PTAB? Many years ago, the Supreme Court addressed
the question of who has standing to challenge the validity of the patent in a
declaratory judgment action in MedImmune v. Genentech.24
The Court basically said there that the Federal Circuit, which at that point
had said that you had to have been sued before you could—or been threatened to
have been sued—before you could challenge, was not right. The test was broader
and allowed people who were in dispute over patent validity where a patent license
was involved to have standing to challenge the validity of a patent. The Federal
Circuit recently in General Electric vs. Raytheon25 summarized the situation as it
saw it as the law at this point now.
The appellant must meet “the irreducible constitutional minimum of
standing.” That “irreducible constitutional minimum” requires the appellant to
“have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged
conduct of the [appellee], and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision. Where Congress has accorded a procedural right to a litigant, such
as the right to appeal an administrative decision” some requirements of standing—
but not the requirement of injury in fact—may be relaxed. In support, the court cited

24

MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
General Electric Company v. Raytheon Technologies Corporation, 983 F.3d 1334
(Fed. Cir. 2020).
25
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the Consumer Watchdog case,26 which was a case on Patent Office re-examination
some years ago.
What does “injury in fact” mean? The case law of the Federal Circuit (again,
remember, we are dealing only with Final Written Decisions—there is no appeal
against decisions on institution of a review) held in the AVX case27 that was
mentioned in the paper I submitted, that simply because a decision may have a
general effect on competition, loss of a challenge to the validity of a patent does
not give you the right to appeal.
The risk that you will be estopped in later proceedings, from raising
anything which you raised or could have raised in IPR or PGR28 does not give you
the right of appeal. This, I think, is an important issue, because in deciding whether
to go ahead with an IPR proceeding or a PGR proceeding, you've got to bear in
mind that those issues which you could have raised in those proceedings cannot
subsequently be raised if you are sued for infringement.
Now, in many cases, as we've heard earlier, the IPR or the PGR follows you
having been sued, but that's not always the case. These situations have been held to
be ones where an appeal against the final decision that the patent is not invalid, or
the claims in question are not invalid, do not work. Where has the Federal Circuit
come down and said that you do in fact have standing to appeal?
The first case where this was done was the DuPont case.29 Where DuPont
gave evidence of what it was intending to do, pointing out what it was intending to
do would infringe the patent in question. The Federal Circuit said, "Yes, okay,
under those circumstances, we recognize that you will suffer an injury in fact if this
patent is upheld wrongly." There was a similar situation in the Altera case,30 where
the challenger was seeking to terminate a license agreement, somewhat similar to
the MedImmune31 situation on declaratory judgments. There, the Federal Circuit
says, "Yes, that's okay."
A situation where your royalty payments might be affected by the decision,
even though it was only some of the patents involved in the agreement, was
presented in the Samsung case.32 Again, you got standing to appeal. On the other
hand, where there is a portfolio license, which was the case, which came down on
Monday in the Apple v. Qualcomm case.33 The Federal Circuit says, “No, you've
got 100,000 patents in this license. We do not see where your challenge to the
validity of some of these is going to affect you in a significant way. Therefore, you
do not have standing to appeal."

26

Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir.

2014).
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AVX Corp. v. Presidio Components, Inc., 923 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Post-grant review.
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E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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Altera Corp. v. PACT XPP Techs., AG, 14-CV-02868-JD, 2015 WL 4999952 (N.D.
Cal. 2015).
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MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
32
Ericsson Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 2:20-CV-00380-JRG, 2021 WL 89980 (E.D.
Tex. Jan. 11, 2021).
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Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., 992 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
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Another situation in which the Federal Circuit held that there was standing
to appeal, was where a patent was stated in the Orange Book to be covering a drug,
which the challenger was contemplating bringing on to market. Again, that was
found to be sufficient standing to appeal. In Nike v. Adidas,34 because the patent
owner was going around suing other people on the patents in question, the Federal
Circuit found that the challenger had sufficient cause to expect an injury from the
patent being upheld. That was given sufficient basis to give standing for appeal.
The problem arises as to how much information you have to give as to what
your intentions are in order to establish that you're going to likely suffer a real injury
from the patent being upheld. The several cases which have addressed this are
General Electric v. Raytheon,35 the only case which I cited from. General Electric
had challenged our patents previously, and then we found that it did not have
standing to sue on jet engines previously, which was found not to have standing to
sue, because it had not shown sufficient relationship between the patent and
anything that it specifically said it intended to do in the future. Therefore, it had not
been able to show that it was going to suffer an injury in fact.
General Electric learned from this in the second case and gave more detail
of the reasons why it thought that jet engines it was developing might fall within
the scope of the patent claim. It has been hypothesized that in the course of doing
that, General Electric, in fact, revealed that Airbus was contemplating a new
narrow-bodied plane because of the information which General Electric had
brought forward in order to satisfy the standing requirement.
In the case on Monday, Apple vs. Qualcomm,36 it is where there were, as I
said, 100,000 patents in the license agreement, they said that we're entitled to
challenge validity because of what was held in Qualcomm in the declaratory
judgment situation. General Electric says, "No, there's 100,000 patents here, we're
not just going to be told that our holding two patents causes you any real injury." It
went on to argue that there were specific patents in question that were ones that
they might infringe, but they brought forward very sketchy evidence as to why they
might infringe.
The Federal Circuit says, "No, you haven't told us enough as to why you
feel that you're going to suffer a real injury, and therefore not enough." Finally, in
that case, the Federal Circuit reiterated what it said previously, that simply being
afraid that you might suffer estoppel as a result of issues being decided against you
in the PTAB and having to appeal against it, that's not enough to show that you are
suffering a real injury in fact to give you a standing to appeal.
We have a rather dangerous situation in my view at the moment on any
attempt to this appeal because if the PTAB holds that something is not valid and
you cannot change that in subsequent district court proceedings and you cannot
appeal that decision of the PTAB, I think you're probably going to need to think
twice about whether you want to bring dodgy cases before the PTAB in the first
place.
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Nike, Inc. v. Adidas AG, 955 F.3d 45 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
Raytheon Techs. Corp. v. Gen. Electric Co., 993 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
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Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., 992 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
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KEN ADAMO: I think we've got three, after listening to presentations so
far and our discussion is we've got three really difficult risky situations with the
PTAB at this point. Mr. Scarpelli, you've been exceedingly patient with me so far.
What have you got to say about what we've been discussing?
BRIAN SCARPELLI: Well, thanks, Ken, and I appreciate being able to be
here. I think very great information and great perspectives and problem statements,
et cetera, have been shared so far. Just to give folks a brief idea because, and this
is on me, I failed to submit a bio for myself that's included in the program, I'm Brian
Scarpelli. I'm a lawyer with a not-for-profit trade association that works on a wide
range of issues, including patent policy generally and PTAB issues, on behalf of
small business technology development firms and software developers. That's just
informing my experience.
Running across all three of these themes, and I'd love to hear anyone's
reaction to any of what I'm about to say, too. When we're talking about the PTAB ,
a great deal of good has been done by it. I think that, by and large, it is adhering to,
I think as a couple of people have talked about already, Congress's intent. It's saved
an estimated $2.3 billion in unnecessary litigation over the years. That's immensely
beneficial to small businesses that simply cannot afford to spend years and a
minimum of hundreds of thousands of dollars in a federal court.
I know we're talking about a lot of problems here with the PTAB, but I think
overall the process has actually been quite beneficial to the small business
community and is in alignment with the AIA. We're one of many amici supporting,
for example, the Federal Circuit's interpretation 37 in the Arthrex case, and we're
hopeful that that comes out in upholding the PTAB.
As far as issues and concerns that I would raise, and again, I think that these
run across all three of the areas—over the last few years, without question, to me,
the PTO has taken a series of actions that are hobbling the IPR process and its
effectiveness. For example, the PTO has implemented some changes to the rules of
practice for instituting a review on challenge claims in an IPR, in a post-grant
review. It has eliminated the presumption in favor of the petitioner for a genuine
issue of material fact created by testimonial evidence submitted with a patent
owner's preliminary response when deciding whether to institute that IPR or postgrant review.
Probably more concerning is something we've been talking about here, and
this is just what we're hearing from the field about the practical impact: the rapidly
growing string of discretionary denials in which the PTO is, in my view, ignoring
the statutory deadline and allowing an IPR to be brought within one year. The PTO
has substituted its own policy preference and directed the discretionary denial of
timely filed IPR petitions if a district court dockets an early trial date. Recent reports
are showing that discretionary denials under 314(a) 38 have grown exponentially
over the past three years. They don't seem to be based on the merits of the petitions.
We're seeing denials of meritorious and timely filed IPR petitions.
I think that towards some recommendations, I would not even dare to
predict the Supreme Court outcome because if I bet five bucks on a baseball game,
37
38

Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
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I lose every time, so I wouldn't try to do that. I think a lot can be done without
Congress acting because unless we're in an alternative universe I don't think we can
count on Congress to act to do anything in a timely or meaningful way. If Congress
takes offense to that, then I'm sorry, but you can't bank on that. You can't bank on
Congress acting to revise the AIA,39 for example.
Whoever comes in to be the next USPTO director, I think can take a number
of very tangible and important intermediate steps to prioritize patent quality, ensure
valid patents issue, protect against the issuance and enforcement of low-quality
patents, and they can stem abuse of the system by augmenting the PTAB that reduce
the costs and risks imposed on companies that I work with, small businesses that
are deeply impacted negatively by frivolous litigation and consulting other
stakeholders. Sorry, that's a number of thoughts I had that run across some of these
different areas. I welcome anyone telling me I'm right, or maybe I'm wrong, but
thanks a lot.
KEN ADAMO: Mr. Scarpelli, thank you. By my eye, we've got six minutes
left in our slots. Here's how I'd like to allocate them. Professor Thomas, you get
four of the six, and Mr. Badenoch gets one minute of the six, and Ms. Martone gets
the last minute of the six. Professor Thomas.
JOHN THOMAS: Thank you, Ken. I agree that reading the tea leaves from
the transcripts of oral arguments at the Supreme Court is a hazardous endeavor. I
believe also that this will be an impactful decision relating to the relationship of the
federal courts to the federal administrative state, and that the Supreme Court will
be quite keen to maintain its own hegemony and push proceedings from agencies
to the court. I don't believe this will be limited to the Patent Office. I think that
depending on the wording of the opinion, it could impact, for example, SEC, 40
FDA,41 FTC,42 any place with an internal administrative, inter partes tribunals in
which a lot of them have it.
I just wish we had called them “appeals examiners” instead of “judges.” I
just think it would have been a little more reflective of what they're doing and what
the role might be. I'm actually going to revert to you a lot of the time, Ken, but I
want to bring up three quick other points. First, the PTAB has a desperate need to
improve its hearing rooms which resemble the average waiting area at LaGuardia
Airport and are shabby and a shame. Second, the PTAB is struggling with its
internal IT systems like many patents offices around the world. It's difficult for
these agencies to use off-the-shelf software. There's a culture of in-house products.
And the PTAB, end-to-end, is something right now that appears to be
hampering the work of the APJs rather than advancing it. Finally, I'd ask each of
you to be on the lookout. The Department of Commerce, the place where the
USPTO sits, is putting out a report. You can expect it in about three months. I'm
sure there'll be some keen readers among the panelists. Thanks so much for having
me, Ken.
KEN ADAMO: Go ahead, George.
39
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GEORGE BADENOCH: I'll just say quickly in one minute in response to
John's presentation. It's obviously a bit of an anomaly that you have a situation
where you don't need standing in a lower tribunal. Yet, you do need standing in
order to appeal the decision from that tribunal. That's just another reason why I
think it would be useful to have standing. I don't really know what the downside of
including standing would be, other than as Brian says, Congress is not going to do
that in a hurry. We understand.
In response to what Brian said, I agree with all that too. I think maybe some
kind of a presumptive stay rule for the district courts might be what's needed here,
where there's not a clear reason that the court has to go instead of the PTAB.
Obviously, what's going on right now is that in their desire, and perhaps their
business model down in Texas, there's really a race here to have a trial date so fast
that plaintiffs can come to court and not worry about being subject to IPRs. I'm not
sure that's the way these things should be decided.
KEN ADAMO: Besides focusing on what is going on in the Western
District of Texas, in Waco, I recall that the ITC's 43 volume of matters has gone up
tremendously. You can get about the same sort of speed out of the ITC as Judge
Albright believes he can generate out of the Western District of Texas. It's not just
Western Texas that's trying to get to court faster than the PTAB can hand out a
Final Written Decision. But the ITC is, essentially, now picking up a lot of that
bandwidth as far as the speed is concerned.
I'd like to thank everybody for your thoughts and your participation. On that
thought, it's a beautiful day. I'm going out and find myself a glass of wine. Thank
you, everybody.
JOHN THOMAS: Thank you, Ken.
KEN ADAMO: Take care.
JOHN RICHARDS: Thank you, Ken.
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